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Disabled foetuses and the search for 
equality  
Rachel Adam-Smith  
 
Abstract 
This paper questions whether and how the Abortion Act 1967 
discriminates against the disabled foetus. It argues that the lack of 
definition and guidance on the terms ‘substantial risk’ and 
‘serious handicap’ affords doctors wide discretionary powers. 
The broad definition and lack of guidance on these terms enables 
the termination of foetuses with completely treatable and 
manageable conditions. This paper contends that the Abortion 
Act has failed to keep pace with advancements in modern 
medicine and human rights. As a result, the existing legislative 
measures provide foetuses with a potential disability a lower level 
of protection than they would otherwise have ‘but for’ their 
diagnosis. In reflecting on the value placed on disabled lives by 
law and society, this paper will argue that the time limit for the 
abortion of disabled foetuses should be brought into line with the 
time limit for non-disabled foetuses. 
 
1! Introduction 
Abortion raises important questions of reproductive autonomy, and 
progress made in this area must be safeguarded. However, medical 
advances are ever-improving thus our understanding of obstetrics and 
neonatal care have raised new questions for the social, moral, and 
medical permissibility of late-term abortions. This paper interrogates 
the provisions of the Abortion Act 1967 (the Abortion Act) in light of 
these advancements by questioning its applicability to foetuses with 
disabilities. It examines the ongoing tension between current legislation 
and the disability rights movement.  
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In its first section, this paper will outline historic and current abortion 
legislation, and will address issues of ambiguity and disagreement 
which stem from the lack of definition to the terms ‘serious handicap’ 
and ‘substantial risk’ within abortion legislation.1  
 
The second section of this paper sets out how the right to life enshrined 
in Article 2 of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) 
applies to foetuses. It raises the question as to whether a viable foetus, 
regardless of disability, should be afforded the same legal protections 
as a premature infant. It draws on the decision of the European Court 
of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Vo v France2 which held that the foetus 
was entitled to ‘some protection of human dignity’.3  
 
Through a comparison with the test for disability discrimination 
protection set out in the Equality Act 2010, this paper then moves to 
examine the ‘serious handicap’ threshold within abortion legislation, 
and attempts to reconcile this test with advances in medical treatment 
that mean many more conditions are now treatable and manageable. 
The fourth section of this paper also draws on the Equality Act and 
applies notions of direct and indirect discrimination to current abortion 
law.  
 
In its fifth section, this paper articulates the need to protect a foetus 
from pain and suffering, by comparison with premature infants. It will 
be argued that there is no intrinsic difference between a premature 
infant and a viable foetus of the same age and level of development.4 
 
1 Abortion Act 1967, s 1(1)(d) Ground E; Sheelagh Mcguiness, ‘Law, Reproduction, 
and Disability: Fatally “Handicapped”?’ (2013) 21 Medical Law Review 213; Elizabeth 
Wicks, Michael Wyldes, and Mark Kilby, ‘Late Termination of Pregnancy for Fetal 
Abnormality: Medical and Legal Perspectives’ (2004) 12(3) Medical Law Review 285. 
2 Vo v France [2005] 40 EHRR 12; Rosamund Scott, ‘Interpreting the Disability 
Ground of the Abortion Act’ (2005) 64 Cambridge Law Journal 388. 
3 Vo v France (n 2). 
4 Jeff Mcmahan, ‘Infanticide and Moral Consistency’ (2013) 39(5) Journal of Medical 
Ethics 272.  
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Thus, it will be argued that there can be no difference in moral status 
between a viable foetus and a premature infant of the same age. This 
section will question the unlimited nature of section 1(1)(d) abortions 
in light of the need to protect a foetus from pain and suffering. Further, 
it will consider whether the process of late-term abortions affords a 
foetus dignity in line with the decision in Vo v France, in which the 
ECtHR made it clear that the foetus was entitled to ‘some protection of 
human dignity’. It concludes by arguing that viable foetuses should be 
afforded the same protections as a premature infant.5 
 
The penultimate section of this paper considers the value that society 
places on disabled lives. It examines the considerable social and 
economic costs of having an impairment, and the potential impact of 
these costs on decisions to abort by prospective parents. It argues that 
parents and their disabled children must be empowered to lead fulfilling 
lives within a society that respects and values disabled lives.6 
 
In the final substantive section of this paper, the issue of genetic 
screening will be addressed. The consequences of advances in genetic 
knowledge and the huge proliferation of prenatal tests has increased 
concern that genetic screening signals powerful messages about 
disabled people’s fundamental right ‘to be’.7 As most genetic testing 
and other screening is completed prior to the current twenty-four-week 
threshold enshrined within the Abortion Act, it questions the ongoing 
need for late-term abortions on the basis of the section 1(1)(d) criteria.  
2! History of abortion legislation  
Abortion is an offence under sections 58 and 59 of the Offences Against 
the Person Act 1861 and section 1(1) of the Infant Life (Preservation) 
Act 1929.8  Section 1(1) of the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929 
 
5 Scott (n 2); Vo v France (n 2).  
6 Scott (n 2). 
7 Linda Ward, ‘Whose right to Choose? The New “Genetics”, Prenatal Testing and 
People with Learning Difficulties’ (2002) 12(2) Critical Public Health 187. 
8 Jo Samanta and Ash Samanta, Medical Law Concentrate: Law Revision and Study 
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provides that it is an offence to destroy the life of a foetus that is 
‘capable of being born alive’ and is punishable up to a maximum 
penalty of life imprisonment. The phrase ‘capable of being born alive’ 
was defined in Rance v Mid-Downs Health Authority9 as ‘breathing and 
living by reason of its breathing through its own lungs alone, without 
deriving any of its living or power of living by or through the 
connection to its mother’. It is noted that, under section 1(2) of the 
Infant Life (Preservation) Act, a foetus of twenty-eight weeks’ gestation 
or older is presumed to be capable of being born alive.10  
 
The Abortion Act legalised the medical process of abortion on certain 
grounds by registered practitioners.11 The Abortion Act allows for the 
abortion up to forty weeks’ gestation on a wide number of grounds.12 
In order to understand the form the Abortion Act took, it is important 
to realise that the legislation was not enacted in order to provide women 
with the right to terminate their unwanted pregnancies.13 The principal 
factor behind public and parliamentary support for legalisation was 
concerns about high mortality rates resulting from illegal abortions, 
especially among the poor.14 Coupled with this, there was inadequate 
contraception, as the pill only became widely available during the 
1960s, meaning that unwanted pregnancies were common. Abortion 
was not legalised in order to enhance women’s reproductive autonomy; 
instead, the main purpose was to enable doctors to act lawfully in 
assisting desperate women to end their pregnancies.15 
 
Guide (3rd edn, OUP 2018) 77; Offences Against the Person Act 1861, ss 58, 59; Infant 
Life (Preservation) Act 1929. 
9 Rance v Mid-Downs Health Authority [1991] 1 All ER 1230, 1241. 
10 Jonathan Herring, ‘Contraception, Abortion and Pregnancy’ in Medical Law and 
Ethics (7th edn, OUP 2018) 324; Life Preservation Act, s 1(1)(2).  
11  NHS, ‘Overview Abortion’ (NHS, 17 August 2016) 
<https://www.nhs.uk/conditions/abortion/> accessed 20 December 2018; Abortion Act, 
s 1(1)(d) Ground E. 
12 NHS (n 11). 
13 Emily Jackson, Medical Law: Text, Cases, and Materials (4th edn, OUP 2016) 9. 
14 Ibid.  
15 ibid. 
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The statutory grounds for an abortion are found in section 1 of the 
Abortion Act, as amended by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Act 1990,! which states:  
 
(1) Subject to the provisions of this section, a person shall not 
be guilty of an offence under the law relating to abortion when 
a pregnancy is terminated by a registered medical practitioner 
if two registered medical practitioners are of the opinion 
formed in good faith  
(a) that the pregnancy has not exceeded its twenty 
fourth week and that the continuance of the pregnancy 
would involve risk, greater than if the pregnancy were 
terminated, of injury to the physical or mental health of 
the pregnant woman or any existing children of her 
family; or  
(b) that the termination is necessary to prevent grave 
permanent injury to the physical or mental health of the 
pregnant woman; or  
(c) that the continuance of the pregnancy would 
involve risk to the life of the pregnant woman, greater 
than if the pregnancy were terminated; or  
(d) that there is a substantial risk that if the child were 
born it would suffer from physical or mental 
abnormalities as to be seriously handicapped.16  
 
It is worth noting here that the Abortion Act still uses the terminology 
‘handicapped’, a word which is now generally avoided in 
communicating with or about disabled people, as set out in the 
Government’s inclusive language guidance issued in December 2018.17  
 
16 Abortion Act, ss 1(1)(a), (b), (c), and (d); Jonathan Herring, Medical Law and 
Ethics (7th edn, OUP 2018) 304. 
17 Gov.uk, ‘Guidance Inclusive Language: Words to Use and Avoid when Writing 
about Disability’ (Gov.uk, 18 December 2019) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/inclusive-communication/inclusive-
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Having set out the statutory criteria, it is important to note that the 
Abortion Act does not allow a woman to decide to terminate an 
unwanted pregnancy. There is no right to abortion, even if the grounds 
in the Act are plainly satisfied. Instead the statute legitimises the 
doctors’ decision to administer an abortion in circumstances which 
meet the section 1(1) criteria. 18 Therefore, the Abortion Act focuses on 
the opinion of the doctors. It is not necessary to show that one of the 
statutory grounds was actually made out; it is sufficient that the doctors 
were of the opinion that it was.19 This means that the statute enshrines 
deference to medical opinion, and a prosecution could only be brought 
on the grounds that the doctors had not acted in good faith. 20 
Consequently, the law empowers doctors, rather than women, to judge 
whether an abortion should be performed. 
 
This paper centres on section 1(1)(d) of the Abortion Act.21 Prior to the 
Abortion Act, statutory protection of foetuses was determined solely by 
the stage of gestation, with twenty-four weeks representing an arbitrary 
cut-off point.22 The Abortion Act altered this by creating a situation 
whereby foetuses are differentiated on the basis of a potential disability 
or ‘serious handicap’.23 Section 1(1)(d) therefore, can be seen as an 
anomaly in the broader context of legislative measures to prevent late-
term abortions, as it affords foetuses with a potential disability a lower 
level of protection than they would have but for their ‘diagnosis.’24  
 
 
 
language-words-to-use-and-avoid-when-writing-about-disability> accessed 20 
November 2018. 
18 Emily Jackson, ‘Abortion, Autonomy and Prenatal Diagnosis’ (2000) 9(4) Social and 
Legal Studies 467. 
19 Herring (n 16) 303. 
20 ibid.  
21 Abortion Act, s 1(1)(d) Ground E; Mcguiness (n 1) 213–242. 
22 Mcguiness (n 1).  
23 ibid. 
24 ibid.  
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3! The foetus and the right to life 
A foetus does not possess a legal personality, therefore, a foetus has no 
right to life in English Law.25 The question as to whether the foetus, 
including the late-term foetus has a right to life under Article 2 of the 
ECHR was addressed by the ECtHR in Vo v France.26 In this case, the 
ECtHR made it clear that the foetus was entitled to ‘some protection of 
human dignity’.27 However, the Court observed that ‘the unborn child 
is not regarded as a “person” directly protected by Article 2 of the 
Convention. Thus, the foetal right to life is implicitly limited by the 
mother’s rights and interests.’28 As a result, the only point of agreement 
is that the embryo or foetus is human. The Court observed that since the 
foetus has the capacity to become a person, it requires ‘protection in the 
name of human dignity, without making it a “person” with the “right to 
life” for the purposes of Article 2’. However, if prenatal life is given 
some legal protection by the criminal law, then it could be argued that 
Article 2 should apply to the foetus at the point when the foetus 
becomes viable.29 Otherwise, the protections afforded to the foetus by 
the criminal law would appear to be redundant and insignificant.  
4! Abortion and the disabled foetus 
The analysis above has shown how the Abortion Act section 1(1)(d) 
provides for a ground of abortion where there is a ‘substantial risk’ that 
the child born would suffer a ‘serious handicap’, 30  known as the 
disability ground for abortion.31 Yet, how ‘serious handicap’ should be 
defined has remained subject to ambiguity and disagreement. Some 
have suggested that the legislation is deliberately vague to avoid 
 
25 Rosamund Scott, ‘The English Fetus and the Right to Life’ (2004) 11(4) European 
Journal of Health 355. 
26 Vo v France (n 2). 
27 ibid [84].  
28 Scott (n 2), Vo v France (n 2).  
29 Scott (n 2).  
30 Abortion Act, s 1(1)(d) Ground E. 
31 ibid. 
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fettering the discretion of the two certifying doctors.32 This is grounded 
in the fact that the Abortion Act is silent on the definition of serious 
handicap. As a result, this broad definition allows the termination of 
foetuses with medical conditions such as cleft lip and/or palate (cl/p), 
which are deemed as treatable, as the NHS guidance states: ‘Most of 
these problems will improve after surgery and with treatments such as 
speech and language therapy.’33  
 
Despite the fact that conditions such as cl/p can be treated, they still fall 
under the umbrella of ‘serious handicap’. The issue as to what 
constitutes a level of disability which might amount to ‘serious 
handicap’ was considered in Jepson v Chief Constable of West Mercia 
Police Constabulary.34 Jepson asked West Mercia Police to investigate 
the circumstances of an abortion carried out on a twenty-eight-week 
foetus with bilateral cl/p.35 The police concluded that the abortion was 
in line with the legislation, whereas Jepson argued that late abortions 
could only be justified for more serious conditions. Leave was granted 
to apply for judicial review and the court concluded that since the 
doctors had formed their opinion in good faith (that the child would be 
seriously disabled), there was insufficient evidence for a conviction, 
and therefore the decision of the police was sound.36  
 
The case of Jepson reinforces the difficulties that arise due to the lack 
of clear definition as to what constitutes ‘serious handicap’ in the 1967 
Act.37 As a consequence of this case, the Disability Rights Commission 
stated:  
 
 
 
32 Mcguiness (n 1), Wicks, Wyldes, and Kilby (n 1).  
33 NHS, ‘Overview cleft lip and palate’ (NHS, 29 July 2016) 
<https://www.nhs.uk/conditions/Cleft-lip-and-palate/> accessed 28 January 2019. 
34 Jepson v Chief Constable of West Mercia Police Constabulary [2003] EWHC 3318.  
35 ibid.  
36 ibid. Samanta and Samanta (n 8) 75. 
37 Mcguiness (n 1).  
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Section 1(1)(d) is offensive to many people; it reinforces 
negative stereotypes of disability, to permit terminations at any 
point during a pregnancy on the grounds of disability, while 
time limits apply to other grounds set out in the Abortion Act, 
is incompatible with valuing disability and non-disability 
equally.38 
 
Disability is the loss or limitation of opportunities to take part in the life 
of the community on an equal level with others.39 By comparing the 
Equality Act with section 1(1)(d) of the Abortion Act, it can be seen 
that the lack of definition afforded to the terms ‘substantial risk’ and 
‘serious handicap’ in section 1(1)(d) illustrates how the Abortion Act is 
at odds with the Equality Act 2010, which specifically defines disability 
as having a physical or mental impairment that has a ‘substantial’ and 
‘long term’ negative effect on your ability to carry out normal daily 
activities.40 The term ‘substantial’ in the Equality Act is defined as 
more than minor or trivial - for example, it takes much longer than it 
usually would to complete a daily task such as getting dressed. 41 
Therefore, if ‘substantial’ was assessed in line with the Equality Act, 
then, the question that needs to be asked is whether the condition in 
question would have more than a minor or trivial impact on the daily 
activities of the child. A lack of definition in the Abortion Act as to the 
terms ‘substantial risk’ and ‘serious handicap’ illustrates there is a lack 
of coherence between the definition of disability under the Equality Act 
and the understandings of foetal disability contained in abortion 
legislation. As a result, the lack of definitional coherence affords the 
 
38 Celia Hall, ‘Disabled Group in Abortion Law Attack’, The Telegraph (London, 22 
August 2001) <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1338130/Disabled-group-
in-abortion-law-attack.html> accessed 16 February 2019. 
39 Tania Burchardt, ‘Capabilities and Disability: The Capabilities Framework and the 
Social Model of Disability’ (2014) 19(7) Disability & Society 735. 
40 Equality Act 2010, section 6(1)(b). Gov.uk, ‘Your Rights under the Law, Definition 
of Disability under the Equality Act 2010’ (Gov.uk, 13 December 2018) 
<https://www.gov.uk/definition-of-disability-under-equality-act-2010> accessed 10 
November 2019. 
41 ibid.  
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medical profession wide discretionary powers. 42  However, this 
definitional failure potentially removes protection for foetuses that may 
well have enjoyed a good quality of life.   
 
The lack of definition discussed above potentially enables society to 
select against some traits. This could exacerbate the discrimination and 
stigmatisation of those with similar traits; so much so that selection 
cannot comfortably coexist with society's professed goals of promoting 
inclusion and equality for people with disabilities.43 Consequently, the 
impaired foetus is in a much weaker legal position than the unimpaired 
one, as highlighted by the case of Jepson.44 Further, in looking to define 
the terms ‘substantial risk’ and ‘serious handicap’ we must reflect on 
the varying degrees of disability, advancements in medicine, and, most 
importantly, the equality agenda and the social need to respect and 
value disabled lives.  
5! The disabled foetus and discrimination 
Tom Shakespeare defines disability equality as the political principle 
that people should be treated equally, should be included rather than 
excluded from society, and should have the right to be heard, regardless 
of physical or intellectual endowment. 45  This implies not only a 
negative obligation not to discriminate, but also a duty to recognise 
differences between people and to take positive action to achieve real 
equality. 46  However, the United Nations (UN) Committee’s 
recommendations illustrate that disability equality in the UK is not 
 
42 Chris Cowland, ‘Selective Abortion: Selecting the Right Response’ (2010) 2 King’s 
Student Law Review 55.  
43 Adrienne Asch, ‘Genes and Disability: Defining Health and the Goals of Medicine: 
Disability Equality and Prenatal Testing: Contradictory or Compatible?’ (2003) 30 
Florida State University Law Review 315. 
44 Scott (n 2); Jepson (n 34). 
45 Tom Shakespeare, ‘Choices and Rights: Eugenics, genetics and disability equality’ 
(1998) 13(5) Disability & Society 665. 
46 Daniel Moeckli and others, International Human Rights Law (3rd edn, OUP 2017) 
148.  
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currently being realised.47 The UN were concerned that some people 
think that disabled people’s lives are less valuable than the lives of non-
disabled people. According to the UK committee, the UK should 
‘change its abortion laws so that they do not allow selective abortion at 
any stage of pregnancy because the foetus has an impairment, while 
respecting women’s rights to reproductive and sexual freedom’. 48 
Furthermore, they recommended that an action plan should be produced 
to stop disabled people being perceived as not having a ‘good and 
decent life’, and to recognise that disabled people are equal to non-
disabled people.49  
 
Unlawful discrimination means treating someone less favourably than 
others on the basis of certain personal attributes that are protected by 
law. 50  The Equality Act states that you must not be discriminated 
against because you have a disability, someone thinks you have a 
disability (this is known as discrimination by perception), or you are 
connected to someone with a disability (this is known as discrimination 
by association).51 Within the Equality Act, a disability is defined as a 
physical or a mental condition which has a substantial and long-term 
impact on your ability to do normal day-to-day activities (section 6 
 
47 European and Human Rights Commission (EHRC), ‘How is the UK Performing on 
Disability Rights, the UN Recommendations for the UK’ (EHRC 18 January 2018) 
<https://equalityhumanrights.com/en/publication-download/how-well-uk-performing-
disability-rights> accessed 10 November 2018. 
48 Ibid 9. 
49 Ibid 14. 
50 Equality Act 2010 Guidance, ‘Guidance on Matters to be Taken into Account in 
Determining Questions Relating to the Definition of Disability. Introduction’ (Equality 
Act 2010 May 2011) 
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachm
ent_data/file/570382/Equality_Act_2010-disability_definition.pdf> accessed 20 April 
2019; Equality Act.  
51  Equality Act, s 6; EHRC, ‘Disability Discrimination’ (EHRC, 11 April 2019) 
<https://equalityhumanrights.com/en/advice-and-guidance/disability-discrimination> 
accessed 20 April 2019.  
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(1)).52  
Protection from discrimination for disabled people applies in a range of 
circumstances.53 Only those disabled people who meet the definition of 
disability in accordance with section 6 of the Equality Act and the 
associated schedules and regulations made under that section will be 
entitled to the protection that the Act provides.54 Whether a person 
satisfies the definition of a disabled person for the purposes of the 
Abortion Act will depend upon the full circumstances of the case. That 
is, whether the substantial adverse effect of the impairment on normal 
day-to-day activities is long term. Importantly, the effects of 
impairments may be more difficult to ascertain in babies and young 
children because they are too young to be assessed against activities 
that are normal and day-to-day for older children and adults.55 
 
Direct discrimination is treating one person less favourably than you 
would treat another person because of a particular protected 
characteristic that the former has. The definition is set out in section 13 
of the Equality Act. In order to establish direct discrimination, the 
complainant has to show that the treatment was less favourable than the 
treatment of someone else in similar circumstances who did not have 
that characteristic.56 In other words, they have to show (comparatively) 
less favourable treatment, not just unfavourable treatment. 
 
A classic example of direct discrimination is when members of a certain 
group are denied access to a public facility, such as a swimming pool, 
which is open to everyone else. But most cases of direct discrimination 
are not as straightforward as this.57 More often, direct discrimination 
 
52 EHRC (n 51). 
53 EHRC, ‘Being Disabled in Britain, A Journey Less Equal’ (EHRC, 3 April 2017) 
<https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/sites/default/files/being-disabled-in-
britain.pdf> accessed 24 April 2019. 
54 Equality Act, s 6. 
55 ibid.  
56 ibid.  
57 Moeckli and others (n 46).  
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occurs covertly: the ‘discriminator’ will not admit that the difference in 
treatment was based on a prohibited ground, making it difficult for the 
complainant to provide sufficient evidence.58 However, it is clear from 
the discussions in this paper that whilst the Abortion Act does not allow 
the abortion of a non-disabled foetus post-twenty-four weeks, it makes 
an exception for the disabled foetus. Therefore, the discrimination that 
this paper contends is extant within the Act does not occur covertly, it 
is openly acknowledged that a foetus can be aborted at any stage in the 
pregnancy based upon disability.  
 
Indirect discrimination is defined by Section 19 of the Equality Act as 
when:  
A person (A) discriminates against another (B) if A applies to 
B a provision, criterion or practice which is discriminatory in 
relation to a relevant protected characteristic of B’s.59 
 
Unlike direct discrimination, indirect disability discrimination can be 
lawful if objectively justified as a proportionate means of achieving a 
legitimate aim.60 Some of the most insidious types of discrimination do 
not operate overtly, but instead come in the form of neutral measures 
that disproportionately affect those with protected characteristics. 61 
Though this paper maintains the distinction made under section 1(1)(d) 
of the Abortion Act, it would also be captured by the indirect 
discrimination measures of the Equality Act if it was deemed a neutral 
measure, as under section 19(2)(b) it puts foetuses with a disability at a 
significant disadvantage as compared with their non-disabled 
counterparts.  
 
Though a discussion of discrimination legislation is important to 
indicate the misalignment between equality policies and abortion 
 
58 ibid.  
59 Equality Act, s 19. 
60 EHRC (n 53).  
61 Ruth Costigan and Richard Stone, Civil Liberties and Human Rights, Freedom from 
Discrimination (Article 14) (11th edn, OUP 2017) 495. 
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legislation, it is important to note that sections 13 (direct 
discrimination) and 19 (indirect discrimination) are both limited in their 
applicability to ‘persons’. As noted above, foetuses lack legal 
personality and thus would not be eligible for protection under the Act.  
6! Pain and legal personality: why disabled 
foetuses require protection 
Some foetuses will have a significant and life-limiting disability. If born 
they would exist without any realistic expectation of a reasonable 
lifespan and/or would suffer immeasurable pain, up to the point of their 
death. Consequently, aborting a disabled foetus with no expectation of 
a long-term life could be considered legitimate, as ultimately you are 
preventing future harm in the form of pain and suffering that could be 
experienced by the child. By way of example, conditions such as Tay-
Sachs disease (a genetic life-limiting condition which destroys nerve 
cells in the brain and spinal cord) or anencephaly (a severe life-limiting 
developmental disorder involving the absence of major portions of the 
brain, skull, and scalp) would fall within this category.62  However, 
where birth is compatible with a good or reasonable quality of life, as 
in the case of Down’s syndrome, then, arguably, it will most likely be 
in the foetus’s interests to be born.63 This argument is supported by Kate 
Greasley, who states that: 
 
only with respect to extremely debilitating and rare diseases 
could the suffering involved in life be so acute that it is plausible 
to suggest that an individual would be better off having that life 
ended before birth.64  
 
62  NHS, ‘Tay-Sachs Disease’ (NHS, 7 February 2018) 
<https://www.nhs.uk/conditions/tay-sachs-disease/> accessed 14 March 2019; NHS, 
‘Fetal Anomaly Screening Programme’ (NHS, 2019). 
<https://www.gov.uk/guidance/fetal-anomaly-screening-programme-overview> 
accessed 14 March 2019; Shakespeare (n 45).  
63 Scott (n 2).  
64 Kate Greasley, Arguments about Abortion: Personhood, Morality, and Law (OUP 
2017) 229. 
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Having addressed the pain and suffering that a future child may feel, 
further consideration must also be given to the pain a disabled foetus 
may feel during the late-term abortion process. As discussed above, if 
further research determines that a foetus does feel pain at the point of 
viability (twenty-four weeks), then it could be argued that the disabled 
foetus should, during the process of late-term abortions, be afforded the 
right to freedom from ‘inhuman or degrading treatment’ under Article 
3 of the ECHR. Arguably, this could establish a further reason as to 
why the Abortion Act provide equality in terms of time limits for non-
disabled foetuses, as proposed by Lord Shinkwin in his private 
members’ bill.65 Despite this, there is of course an issue as to whose 
rights should take priority – the mother’s or the foetus’s. This paper has 
established that the Abortion Act was not enacted in order to provide 
women with the right to terminate their unwanted pregnancies. 66 
However, section 1(1)(d) seemingly prioritises the mother’s rights over 
those of the foetus. The effect of raising a disabled child and the 
potential rationale underpinning the prioritisation of material rights, 
will be discussed later in this paper. 
 
Conversely, Chris Cowland argues that the abortion of a foetus with 
disabilities seeks to allow only the birth of children with desirable 
characteristics and essentially murders those who lack such attributes 
or more accurately, who possess undesirable traits.67 Further, Cowland 
asserts that a foetus can be murdered and that selective abortion is the 
same as infanticide.68 McMahan also argues that there is no intrinsic 
difference between a premature infant and a viable foetus of the same 
age and level of development.69 Thus, if moral status is a function of 
intrinsic properties only, there can be no difference in moral status 
 
65 HL Deb 21 October 2016, vol 774 col 2545.  
66 Jackson (n 13) 698. 
67 Cowland (n 42).  
68 ibid. 
69 Mcmahan (n 4) 273. 
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between a viable foetus and a premature infant of the same age.70 
Disabled and non-disabled foetuses must therefore be afforded the same 
levels of protection vis-à-vis infliction of pain.  
 
The International Association for the Study of Pain defines pain as ‘an 
unpleasant sensory and emotional experience associated with actual or 
potential tissue damage’.71 To feel something is defined as having ‘the 
emotions excited, to experience a sensation’.72 These definitions imply 
that the brain must achieve a certain level of neural functioning, as well 
as having prior experience, before pain can be understood.73 Currently, 
there is no direct way of assessing pain in foetuses.74 The most rational 
approach is to make an informed guess based on the knowledge of the 
development and function of the nervous system at different gestational 
ages. Pain is a complex phenomenon, however, and even if the nature 
of the experience changes with development, this does not prove that 
immature humans cannot be distressed by pain.  
 
Ferschl and others argue that invasive foetal procedures clearly elicit a 
stress response, but it is unclear if this response correlates with 
conscious perception of pain.75 Furthermore, they state that by nineteen 
weeks’ gestation, a foetus can reflexively withdraw from a noxious 
stimulus without involvement of the cerebral cortex. They state, even if 
pain fibres reach the cortex at twenty-four weeks’ gestation, the signals 
may not translate into what we perceive as pain.76 However, Lloyd-
Thomas and Fitzgerald state that even at twenty-six weeks very low 
 
70 ibid.  
71  International Association for the Study of Pain (IASP), ‘Pain’ (IASP, 2018) > 
https://www.iasp-pain.org/Education/Content.aspx?ItemNumber=1698> accessed 12 
February 2019.  
72 Stuart Derbyshire and others, ‘Do Foetuses Feel Pain?’ (1996) 313 British Medical 
Journal 795; IASP (n 72).  
73 Derbyshire (n 73). 
74 ibid.  
75 Marla Ferschl and others, ‘Anesthesia for in Utero Repair of Myelomeningocele’ 
(2013) 118(5) Anesthesiology 1211. 
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127  Volume I – Spring 2020 
birthweight infants show a clear and measurable flexion withdrawal 
reflex to noxious stimulation, suggesting that nociceptive afferent 
(perception to pain) input to the spinal cord is present.77 Whilst these 
studies were carried out after birth, it is reasonable to infer that such 
responses would also occur in utero.78 As there have been considerable 
advances in prenatal diagnostic technologies, especially 
ultrasonography, an increasing number of foetal anomalies are being 
diagnosed early in gestation.79  
 
The issue of pain perception is discussed further in the following 
paragraphs. Koul and others state that available scientific evidence 
show that possible foetal pain perception occurs well before late 
gestation, during the second trimester. 80  However, the British 
Pregnancy Advisory Service states that current research shows the 
senses of the foetus are not developed enough to feel pain before 
twenty-eight weeks’ gestation.81 Despite suggestions from the Royal 
College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists (RCOG) that foetuses are 
certainly unable to experience pain until at least the end of the second 
trimester (twenty-six weeks), Koul and others state that adequate pain 
relief should be provided to a foetus from mid-gestation onwards during 
any surgical procedure. 82  
 
The issue of pain that a foetus may feel needs further attention, so that 
 
77 Derbyshire (n 73).  
78 ibid. Katharine Andrews and Maria Fitzgerald ‘The Cutaneous Withdrawal Reflex in 
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Stimulation’ (1994) 56 Science Direct 95. 
79  Archna Koul, Raminder Sehgal, and Jayashree Sood, ‘Anaesthesia for Foetal 
Surgery’ (2015) 5 Current Medicine Research and Practice 22. 
80 ibid. 
81  British Pregnancy Advisory Service, ‘Abortion: Frequently Asked Questions’ 
(BPAS, 2015) <https://www.bpas.org/abortion-care/considering-abortion/abortion-
faqs/> accessed April 2019.  
82 Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists, ‘Fetal Awareness Review of 
Research and Recommendations for Practice’ (RCOG, March 2010) 
<https://www.rcog.org.uk/globalassets/documents/guidelines/rcogfetalawarenesswpr0
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pain management for all foetuses is consistent. Particularly, as the 
RCOG states, ‘the case for administering analgesia after twenty-four 
weeks when the neuroanatomical connections are in place, needs to be 
considered.’83  Vivette Glover suggests that foetuses over seventeen 
weeks old may feel pain and states, ‘given there is a possibility (that a 
foetus can feel pain) we should give the foetus the benefit of the 
doubt’.84  
 
The evidence set out above indicates there is a difference in the 
administration of pain dependent on whether the foetus is to be aborted 
or operated on in utero. On that basis, it is questionable whether the 
late-term abortive foetus is afforded the same level of dignity in line 
with the decision in Vo v France (discussed above),85 in which the 
ECHR made it clear that the foetus was entitled to ‘some protection of 
human dignity’.86 This is particularly important when reflecting on the 
process of abortion carried out in the third trimester. Whether the 
process of abortion subjects a foetus to inhuman or degrading treatment 
and what should amount to ‘human dignity’ needs further consideration 
but goes beyond the remit of this paper. However, it is clear from the 
findings set out above that further guidance is required as to what is 
meant by ‘some protection of human dignity’. 87 Further, there is a need 
for further research to establish whether a foetus feels pain, particularly, 
as at twenty-six weeks, very low birthweight infants show a clear and -
measurable flexion withdrawal reflex to noxious stimulation, 
suggesting that nociceptive perception to pain input to the spinal cord 
is present. 88  Consequently, it is reasonable to assume that such 
responses to pain would also occur in utero and as such, the issue as to 
whether a foetus feels pain needs addressing further.89 
 
83 ibid.  
84 BBC News, ‘Abortion Causes Foetal Pain’, The BBC (London, 29 August 2000) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/900848.stm> accessed 19 April 2019. 
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7! Disabled children and social exclusion 
One measure of social development is how society chooses to support 
and enhance the opportunities for all members of society, not just for 
those who are considered able-bodied.90 It is reported by the Equality 
and Human Rights Commission that more disabled people than non-
disabled are living in poverty or are materially deprived.91 As a result, 
parents are often unable to buy specialist equipment, whether sensory, 
medical or educational. 92  Families with disabled children are often 
more socially isolated than other families, and a lack of money is one 
of the main causes. 93  Thus, parents are faced with many barriers 
including affordability and inaccessible facilities. Furthermore, Zaidi 
and Burchardt argue that the extra costs of a disability are substantial, 
with costs rising in line with the severity of the disability.94 For families 
with children who have disabilities, the decision of one parent not to 
work may be more of a necessity than a choice.95 It is evident that the 
monetary expenses associated with raising disabled children in terms of 
both out-of-pocket outlays and opportunity costs are significantly 
higher than those associated with raising non-disabled children. 96 
Consequently, a disabled person’s family will achieve a lower standard 
of living than a non-disabled person’s family on the same level of 
income.97  
 
 
90  Shirley Porterfield, ‘Work Choices of Mothers in Families with Children with 
Disabilities’ (2002) 64(4) Journal of Marriage and Family 972.  
91 EHRC (n 53).  
92 Contact a Family, ‘Counting the Costs 2012. The Financial Reality for Families with 
Disabled Children Across the UK’ (Contact a Family, 2012) 
<https://contact.org.uk/media/381221/counting_the_costs_2012_full_report.pdf> 
accessed 23 March 2019. 
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94  Asghar Zaidi and Tania Burchardt, ‘Comparing Incomes when Needs Differ: 
Equivalization for the Extra Costs of Disability in the UK’ (2005) 51(1) Review of 
Income and Wealth 89.  
95 Porterfield (n 91).  
96 ibid.  
97 Zaidi and Burchardt (n 95). 
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The prevalence of poverty and social exclusion experienced by disabled 
families can have consequent impacts on the decision of prospective 
mothers considering termination. 98  On this reasoning, prospective 
parents would be making a decision based on the society that they live 
in, not necessarily the intrinsic effects of impairment. 99  Arguably, 
society should be morally obliged to do more to remove discrimination 
and social barriers, thus supporting all members of society equally.100  
It is accepted that a woman should have the reproductive autonomy to 
terminate a pregnancy whatever her reasons, but she must also feel 
empowered not to terminate the foetus, and confident that society will 
do what it can to enable her and her child to live fulfilling lives.101 
However, Meakin argues that the interests of all parties concerned – not 
only those of ‘the person the child may become’, but also those of the 
parents, the family, the ‘next child’, and the community – are often 
considered. 102  Thus, it is argued that the decision to terminate a 
pregnancy often rests upon a utilitarian calculation taking all of these 
parties’ interests into account. 
 
There is also a consequential concern that discrimination against 
disabled people can be aggravated by this practice. Kate Greasley 
argues that the routine termination of disabled foetuses diminishes the 
quality of life of disabled persons by depleting their numbers. 103 
Furthermore, she argues that with fewer disabled people in the world, 
the motivation to adapt the environment so as to counter the 
disadvantage experienced by disabled persons who do exist may be 
weaker.104 For example, when the number of wheelchair-users is high, 
 
98 Porterfield (n 91).  
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there is a greater incentive for the state, and others, to invest in the 
infrastructure that allows wheelchair access, such as ramps or disabled 
bathrooms, but less incentive when there are fewer wheelchair-users 
requiring such facilities. 
!
Social barriers and financial implications, often result in prospective 
parents making a decision based on the society that they live in, rather 
than the intrinsic effects of impairment.105 As Shakespeare argues, the 
fewer disabled people there are, the less need there is to adapt, or 
understand how society could be more inclusive.106  Moreover, it is 
argued that by screening and terminating those with disabilities one 
may in fact be selecting against impairments that could be successfully 
alleviated with greater public support.107  
8! Proposals for reform: advancements in genetic 
screening and the value of disabled life 
For the disabled community, prenatal diagnosis followed by abortion is 
a social, moral, and political issue, not simply a health or medical one, 
as traditionally perceived.108  The very existence of a test for foetal 
abnormality can create pressures to use the technology in order to reach 
an early diagnosis. Therefore, it is naïve to say that technology is 
neutral, because the possibility of obtaining prenatal genetic 
information inevitably creates new problems and dilemmas which did 
not previously exist. The implication is that testing, and subsequent 
selection are desirable advances.109 Ward argues that: 
 
the ‘effectiveness’ of prenatal diagnosis is determined by health 
economists, via cost-benefit analysis which set the resources 
invested in screening against the savings that result, that is the 
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savings to the State of the costs of supporting a disabled child.110  
 
Thus, it is argued, that the State’s interest in prenatal testing is not about 
women making an informed choice but about making a particular 
choice, namely to abort foetuses with severe impairments. 111  Scott 
supports this argument, and states that ‘the routine nature of screening, 
can be interpreted as an overzealous attempt to eliminate disability’.112 
As a result, it is argued that the approach of science fails to distinguish 
between impairment (biological) and disability (social). 
 
On this point, Shakespeare goes on to argue that ‘far from valuing 
disabled people, our society currently views disabled people as an 
unnecessary social cost’.113 Further, he states that ‘foetuses with genetic 
abnormalities are terminated because society places no value on 
disabled lives, and because the social and economic costs of having an 
impairment in a disabling society are considerable’.114  However, he 
concludes, ‘the decisions underlying selective termination may often be 
about the social implications of bringing up a disabled child, not a 
eugenic unwillingness to bring disabled people into the world’.115 Thus, 
advances in genetic knowledge and the huge proliferation of prenatal 
tests adds to concerns that genetic testing raises fundamental question 
about disabled people’s right ‘to be’.116  
 
By way of example, if we consider individuals with Down’s syndrome, 
it is argued that most of these individuals lead healthy lives. 117 
However, Down’s syndrome is one of the two most common conditions 
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for which prenatal testing is offered. Given that people with Down’s 
syndrome rarely suffer physical pain or distress as a direct result of their 
primary impairment (though they may have other conditions in 
addition), it is questionable as to whether the impairment should be 
described as ‘serious’.118 Thus, Ward argues that prenatal testing for 
Down’s syndrome is more about preventing the ‘suffering’ (social or 
psychological) of others (e.g. parents), than of the individual directly 
affected.119 Moreover, Marteau and Drake found that where women 
gave birth to children with Down’s syndrome, having declined the 
opportunity to have prenatal screening, they were consequently more 
likely to be blamed for their situation.120 Thus, the routine gestational 
screening for Down’s syndrome is indicative of social expectations that 
a positive diagnosis should at least provoke a serious consideration 
about termination.121  
 
We turn now to the screening for Down’s syndrome and other 
syndromes. According to the NHS website, screening for Down’s 
syndrome and other syndromes is offered between ten and fourteen 
weeks.122  Amniocentesis is usually carried out between fifteen and 
twenty weeks of pregnancy, but may be later if necessary (though there 
is a lack of guidance on the meaning of necessity here). 123  An 
alternative to amniocentesis is a test called chorionic villus sampling, 
which may be carried out between the eleventh and fourteenth week of 
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pregnancy if there is an increased risk of genetic or chromosomal 
disorders.124 A further detailed ultrasound scan, sometimes called the 
mid-pregnancy scan, is usually carried out between eighteen and 
twenty-one weeks and looks at the baby’s bones, heart, brain, spinal 
cord, face, kidneys, and abdomen.125 None of the timeframes set out by 
the NHS are post-twenty-four weeks. This raises the question as to why 
abortion on the grounds of disability are possible up to the point of birth 
if genetic testing appears to be complete by twenty-four weeks. 
 
The question of time limit for the abortion of disabled foetuses was 
central to the proposals that were put forward by Lord Shinkwin in his 
Abortion (Disability Equality) Bill. Lord Shinkwin proposed that the 
time limit for the abortion of foetuses where there is a ‘substantial risk’ 
of ‘serious handicap’ should be brought into line with the time limit for 
non-disabled foetuses.126 He justified this by stating that section 1(1)(d) 
of the Act creates a ‘search and destroy’ approach to screening, and 
questioned how this can be consistent with principles of equality.127 
Further, he argued, ‘there is an inconsistency within the law, whereby 
discrimination on the grounds of disability is prohibited in law after 
birth, yet is enshrined in law at the very point at which the 
discrimination begins, before birth’.128 Thus, he stated, ‘laws governing 
disability discrimination and abortion are moving in conflicting and 
contradictory directions’. 129  Lord Shinkwin suggested that any 
abortions by reason of disability need to be carried out within the first 
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twenty-four weeks, except when there is a risk of serious permanent 
damage to the mother or her life is at risk, in which case they will 
remain legally permissible until birth, and governed by section 1(1)(a) 
of the Abortion Act.130 As set out above, genetic screening according to 
the NHS guidance seems to be complete by twenty-four weeks. 
Therefore, there appears to be no reason why abortion based on the 
grounds of disability should be allowed or is necessary over the twenty-
four-week time limit.131 
9!  Conclusion  
One of the main issues discussed in this paper is the lack of definition 
for the terms ‘serious handicap’ and ‘substantial risk’.132 This lack of 
guidance affords doctors wide discretionary powers, and potentially 
gives disproportionate weight to subjective medical notions of ‘serious’ 
and ‘substantial’. Importantly, this broad definition allows the 
termination of foetuses with medical conditions such as cl/p, which are 
considered to be treatable.133 This paper has determined that the lack of 
definition to the above-mentioned terms illustrates that the Abortion 
Act, section 1(1)(d) fails to reflect the changes in the law and medical 
advancements.134 The terms ‘substantial risk’ and ‘serious handicap’ 
should be clearly defined, so as not to lead to the abortion of foetuses 
with conditions which in reality are not ‘serious or substantial’.  
The Equality Act fails to prohibit discrimination against the disabled 
foetus, despite protecting other characteristics such as race and sex, and 
despite the fact disability is a protected characteristic.135 Therefore, this 
paper agrees with Lord Shinkwin’s contention that the ability to abort 
a disabled foetus at any point in a pregnancy puts section 1(1)(d) at odds 
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with more general developments in the equality agenda. 136 
Furthermore, the lack of time limitations on section 1(1)(d) abortions 
seems at odds with with the fact that NHS genetic screening appears to 
be completed before twenty-four weeks’ gestation. This paper 
concludes that, in line with the proposals put forward by Lord 
Shinkwin, the disabled foetus should be afforded the same legal 
protections as the non-disabled foetus. This can be achieved by bringing 
the twenty-four-week time limit for disabled foetuses in line with non-
disabled foetuses, except when there is a risk of serious permanent 
damage to the mother or her life is at risk, in which case they will 
remain legally permissible until birth. 137  This would mean that the 
ability to abort over twenty-four weeks would be allowed only when 
there is risk of serious permanent damage to the mother or her life is at 
risk.  
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